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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The attitude of some courts in their consideration of "thin skin"
plaintiffs is reflected by the lawyers' joke which defines "emotional
trauma as a 'state of mind precipitated by an accident, stimulated
by an attorney, perpetuated by avarice and cured by a verdict.' ,4
THOMAS E. CAPPS
Torts-Products Liability-Sale Requirement
The decline of the requirement of a sale in the field of products
liability parallels the decline of the requirement of privity.' Both
are being replaced by "strict tort liability."
Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.2 reveals the final stage of this de-
velopment. The court in Delaney held a manufacturer of a defective
fork lift strictly liable to an injured employee of a prospective
buyer who had the lift on a demonstration loan directly from the
manufacturer. In overcoming the defendant's argument of "no sale,
no warranty," the court went beyond the recognition that a sale is
not always a requisite of warranty and stated that products liability
should no longer be characterized as warranty liability but rather as
"strict tort liability."3
In the past, products liability has been limited and confined by
the uncertain nature and character of warranty-more specifically
by the contractual barriers associated with it." Although the require-
ment of privity is said to be the major deterrent to new frontiers
of products liability,' the idea that warranty requires a "sale" also
has been an obstacle. It is said that goods are warranted only when
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale,6 generating the conten-
' Time, Feb. 14, 1964, p. 75.
'For a distinction between the two requirements, see, e.g., Epstein v.
Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963) (elimination
of the privity requirement having no effect on the force of the sale re-
quirement) ; Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d
468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962) (benefit of a privity exception having no effect
upon the sale requirement).
339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
'Id. at 6.
'Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
'l1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 3 (1964).
'UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15. Although North Carolina has not adopted
the Uniform Sales Act, it could easily be indirectly applied since the act
is recognized as a codification of the common law. McCarley v. Wood
Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934). Also, recent North Caro-
lina cases state that warranty is an element in a contract of sale. See
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tion "that in the absence of a sale to and a purchase by the plaintiff,
there is no 'vehicle to carry an implied warranty' by the manufac-
turer."' Some courts have decided warranty litigation on this nar-
row issue of "sale or no sale," consciously or unconsciously overlook-
ing the possibility that a warranty can arise in the absence of a sale.'
In those cases where the crucial issue has been the existence of a
"sale," the passage of title to the goods is not required ;' but either
a statutory payment" or an executory contract" and a delivery12
are required. These requisites are satisfied in a "sale" of a container
because it is essential to the sale of its contents.3 However, ma-
Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 136 S.E.2d
56 (1964); Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d
21 (1960). Moreover, the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code
to products liability has been said to be limited to the sale of the product.
Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963);
19 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 178 (1964).
" Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602- , 6 Cal.
Rptr. 320, 323 (1960).
'In declaring "no sale, no warranty" of a product used in a beauty
treatment, the court in Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197
A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963), supports its decision with cases that also stand for
the proposition that warranty may arise without sale. The court in its
application of the Uniform Commercial Code also overlooks a comment
that indicates that the sales language of the warranty sections of the Code
is not to be a limitation of the case law growth which has recognized
"that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the
direct parties to such a contract." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313,
comment 2 at 88 (1962 Official Text). See generally, Farnsworth, Implied
Warranties of Quality In Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957).
' Warranty liability imposed upon the owner of a chartered vessel and
upon the seller by a conditional sales contract indicates that title passage
is not required. Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 659-60 & nn. 47 & 48. But cf.
Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co., 153 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1963).
"0 In Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N.Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1936),
an employee was denied recovery for an illness resulting from a meal
served as part of her wages because the statutory sale contemplated pay-
ment in personal property and services. This problem with the definition of
price, arising from a literal interpretation of UNIFORM SALES ACT § 9(2),
has been corrected by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-304(1), making the
price "payable in money or otherwise."
" A promise to pay the purchase price is sufficient, Barni v. Kutner, 45
Del. 550, 76 A.2d 801 (1950), but where only an offer to contract exists
such as the mere selection of an item in a self-service store, no warranty
is said to arise, Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65
N.E.2d 305 (1946); Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 113
N.Y.S.2d 436 (1952). However, handing the article to a checker in such
a store will give rise to warranty liability. Sanchez-Lopez v. Fedco Food
Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 131, 211 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1961). See generally 1 WILLIS-
TON, SALES § 230(b) (Supp. 1964).
1" Mechanical delivery of the product, as by a vending machine, is
sufficient. Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 108 N.E.2d
757 (1952).
" There is a sale of the container even though it is returnable. Trust
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terial essential to a contract for construction,14 repair, 15 or profes-
sional services 6 is not considered to be sold because the "essence"
of the transaction is said to be the sale of the labor or services
rendered and not the sale of the finished product. This weighing of
the entire transaction reflects the courts' hesitancy to impose strict
liability for services and labor by implying a warranty to the material
supplied.' 7  As consumer demand for more protection increases,
however, this attitude changes and transactions are reclassified.
The purchase of a meal in a restaurant has undergone such a transi-
tion, from one of the services of an innkeeper to a sale of goods,'"
and there are a few indications that other transactions may be
treated similarly. 9 Finally, where the transaction has the elements
v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, -, 324 P.2d 583, 592 (1958) (con-
curring and dissenting); Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440,
108 N.E.2d 757 (1952). This is true even though no separate consideration
is given for it. Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963). North Carolina refuses to extend warranty to a
container but without reference to the sale requirement. Phillips v. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 728, 125 S.E.2d 30 (1962); Prince v. Smith,
254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961).
" E.g., Foley Corp. v. Dove, 101 A.2d 841 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1954);
Stammer v. Malvancy, 264 Wis. 244, 58 N.W.2d 671 (1953). Cf. Annot.,
111 A.L.R. 341 (1937).
"5 Cf. Sam White Oldsmobile Co. v. Jones Apothecary, Inc., 337 S.W.2d
834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
'. Blood furnished to perfect a cure is not warranted because a trans-
fusion is just an incidental part of the professional services performed.
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
This denial of warranty by an insistence upon a sale has been consistently
upheld in the "bad blood" cases. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial
Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965). For criticism of the
• 
. 965. Fo crtcsmo-h
"bad blood" rationale, see 69 HARV.Lv. 391 (1955); 37 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 565 (1961); 29 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 305 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. Rnv.
833 (1955).
'"A different line has been followed in England. While most sales rules
must be applied to a transaction in toto or not at all, warranties may be
implied as to only a part-that concerned with goods furnished as opposed
to services rendered or labor done." Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 664.
" Compare Rickner v. Ritz Restaurant Co., 13 N.J. Misc. 818, 181 Atl.
398 (1935), with Sofman v. Denham Food Serv., Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181
A.2d 168 (1962). The majority would also find a sale and consequently a
warranty in the "extras" of a meal such as salt and pepper or glass of
water. Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E.2d 731 (1938).
See DICKERSON, PRODUcTs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 157-80
(1951). The Code endeavors to solve the restaurateur conflict by declaring
the serving of food and drink a sale for the purposes of warranty. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1).
"For an example of this transition in the typical service or labor
contract, see Burge Ice Machine Co. v. Weiss, 219 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.
1955) (contract for installation of refrigeration system); Hanson v.
Murray, 190 Cal. App. 2d 617, 12 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1961) (contract for
application of weed killer). Cf. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182
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of a sale, an implied warranty is not destroyed merely because it is
an illegal sale."
More enlightened courts realize and accept that a sale as such
is not the only transaction in which warranties are implied.2 1 Al-
though still the exception, such courts imply "true"22 warranty
liability to articles bailed for hire or for mutual benefit where a
technical sale is obviously missing,2 to food served in a restaurant
irrespective of whether there is a sale of the food,24 and to the ma-
terial in a construction contract even though a lack of sale of goods
is conceded.5 Thus the trend appears to be that although the
implied warranties of the Uniform Sales Act apply only to sales
of goods, "similar warranties may be implied in other contracts not
governed by such statutory provisions when the contracts are of
such a nature that the implication is justified. 2
Instead of stating in the principal case that a sale is no longer
necessary to imply a warranty, the court eliminated warranty li-
ability altogether and with it the requirement of sale. This finality
was accomplished by the court's application of Restatement of Torts
Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960), where it was declared that a
sale in the marketing process would be sufficient to impose warranty upon
the manufacturer of a new drug even though the plaintiff's inoculation,
like a transfusion, was not a sale. For criticism, see 13 STAN. L. REv. 645
(1961) (public policy misconceived). This inconsistency between a blood
transfusion and a new drug innoculation may be realistically settled in the
manufacturer's favor based on public policy and not on "sale." RESTATE-
ImENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 402A, comment k (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
Contra, Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So. 97 (1925).
"11 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcrs LIABILITY § 19.02 (1964);
Farnsworth, supra note 8.
" In the majority of the bailment cases, the term "implied warranty"
actually imposes a negligence requirement, especially when personal in-
juries are involved. The bailor "impliedly warrants only that he has exer-
cised reasonable care to ascertain that the chattel is safe and suitable for
the purposes for which it was hired." McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d
740, 742, 255 P.2d 810, 812 (1953). See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R. 774
(1921).
"E.g., Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192
A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963) (personal injuries); Covello v. State, 17 Misc.
2d 637, 187 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1959) (personal injuries); Hoisting Engine
Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923) (property damage).
"
4E.g., Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Stanfield
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53 P.2d 878 (1936); Sartin v.
Blackwell, 200 Miss. 579, 28 So. 2d 222 (1946).
"5Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 12 Cal. Rptr.
257, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).20 Id. at 582, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 262, 360 P.2d at 902.
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section 402A,2 7a section described as a special rule of strict liability
based purely in torte' and applicable to sellers of defective products.
Aimed at the elimination of the contract rules associated with
"warranty,"29 it adequately handles the requirement of privity" and
even states that it "is not governed by the provisions of the Uni-
form Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code; and
it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warran-
ties, or by any limitation to 'buyer' and 'seller' in those statutes."'"
However, the drafters unfortunately chose to characterize the de-
fendant of this section as a "seller,"3 2 thereby limiting the section's
significance. Delaney, however, lends new life to the section by
regarding this restrictive feature
as a description of the situation that has most commonly arisen
rather than as a deliberate limitation of the principle to cases
where the product has been sold, intentionally excluding instances
where a manufacturer has placed a defective article in the stream
of commerce by other means 3 3
The true import of Delaney is now evident. A new concept of
products liability has been adopted, and it is clearly stated that such
future law will not be limited by the requirement of sale.34
DAVID A. IRVIN
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"8 Id. comment mn.
Ibid.SId. comment 1.
81Id. comment in at 10.
22 Id. comments f & I (illustrations).
82 339 F.2d at 6.
"' If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in
tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask. Such strict
liability is familiar enough in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous
activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, and respondeat superior.
There is nothing so shocking about it today that cannot be accepted and
stand on its own feet in this new and additional field, provided always
that public sentiment, public demand, and "public policy" have reached
the point where the change is called for.
Prosser, supra note 4, at 1134.
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